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ACCOMMODATION PAPER
What is Accommodation?
A draft may be drawn or accepted, a note may be
made, either draft or note may be endorsed for accomot
dation. "An accomodation party" says the 29th section
of the Negotiable Instrument Act of 1901,* "is one who
has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor"
or indorser without receiving value therefor, and for
the purpose of lending his name to some other person."
"Lending -his name" is a phrase Which is less intelligible than ancient. The lender retains the name whch he
lends. More illuminating is the phrase, to describe accomodation, "a loan of the credit of the maker to the
extent of the value of the note."' Ordinarily the accommodating party creates no pecuniary obligation himself.
He simply authorizes someone else to create it, by
transferring the paper on which his name is to some one
towards whom, by this transfer, an obligation arises.
1P. L. page 199.
'Appleton vs. Donaldson 3 Pa. 381 Moore vs. Baird 30 Pa. 138
Peale vs. Addicks 174 Pa. 543 (see definition of Story and of
Daniels here quoted) Nat. Bank vs. Dick 22 Super. 445, Carpenter vs. Bank 106 Pa. 170, Bank vs. Todd 162 Pa. 315 (see remarks
of Mitche l J. on the popular and legal sense of accommodation,
Mosser vs. Criswell 150 Pa. 409.
'Savings Fund Co. vs. Ifart 217 Pa. 506, Typesetting Co. vs,
Ober 06 Super. 291.
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Thus A to accommodate B, makes a promise to B to pay
him or order $500.00. By the delivery of this note, no
obligation springs up. But B may endorse the note to
C, and, towards C, create an obligation on A to pay the
money. Occasionally, when A is indebted to B, C makes
a note payable to B, for the amount of the debt -A not
being a party to the note, and such making is said to
be an acconTnodation making, A may be the owner of
the note obtained for the price of goods sold by him to
its nmaker, and, endorsing it, he may deliver it to X, to aid
X, who however does not become a party to it by endorsement. This is an endorsement by A for the accommodation
of X. Occasionally a "strict" sense of accommodation
paper is spoken of. A paper is not such, in the strict
sense unless the person to whom the paper is entrusted
for use is "without restriction as to the mnanner of its
use."

Acts of Accommodation, Making Note
The making of a note is a frequent act of accommodation for the payee, or subsequent holder,' or for some
one who does not become a party to the note, as when
B-desiring a loan from X A makes his note, directly to
X who delivers the money to B'or when A, indebted to C
induces B to give his note directly to C for the amount
of the debt'. B may accommodate A, by jointly with A,
making a note, the proceeds of whose discount, A is to
receive!.
iGunnis vs. Weigley 1.4 Pa. 191.

In Holmes vs. Paul 3 Gr.

299, Thompson J. speaks of "business paper" and "accommodation
paper".
'Lenheim vs. Wilmarding 55 Pa. 73; Lord vs. Ocean Bank 20

Pa. 394; Moore vs. Baird 30 Pa. 188.
'Nat. Bank vs. Dick 22 Superior 445; Leatherman
Dusen 9 Sadler 305.
'Trust Co. vs. Hazen 199 Pa. 17.

vs. Van

'Snyder vs. Elliott, 2 Penny. 474.

"Nat. Bank vs. Kaufman 44 Super. 567; Chamber vs. McLean
24 Super. .567; Nat. Bank vs. Long 20 PFa. 656; Diffenbacher's Es-

tate 31 Super. 35,
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Endorsing
By endorsing, obligations are assumed, and they
may be assumed not for the benefit of the endorser,
but of another. B may consent to be payee in a note,
and, endorsing it, may allow A to retain the possession of it,-" A may draw a note to his own order, and
endorse it, and B may endorse it for A's benefit." Of
several endorsements, one or more may be for accommnodation, e. g. the second,'," the fourth, One, who for
value is the owner of the note, may endorse it for the
benefit of another, tho may, or may not,1' becorae a
party to the note. A note drawn for the maker's accommodation may be endorsed by a number, either as joint
endorsers"9 or as several successive endorsersL"
Irregular Indorsement
The 64th section of The Negotiable Instrument Act
provides that, if a person not otherwise a party to an
instrument places thereon his signature in blank, before delivery, he is liable as endorser thus; If the instrument is payable to a third party, he is liable to the
payee', and all subsequent parties. If it is payable to
the order of the maker, or drawer, or to bearer he is
liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer.
If he signs for the accommodation of the payee he is
liable to all parties subsequent to the payee.
'Nat. Bank vs. Tustin 57 Super. 37; Bank vs. Trexler 174 Pa.
497; Nat. Bank vs. Nill 213 Pa. 456; Struthers vs. Kendall 41 Pa.
214; Newbold vs Boraef 155 Pa. 227.
IATldreds' Estate 229 Pa. 632.
=Ott vs. Seward 221 Pa. 630.
'Nat Bank vs. Coal Co. 220 Pa. 39

SiiGunnis vs. Weigley 114 Pa. 191.

'Russ vs. Sadler 197 Pa. 51
"Youngs vs. Ball 9 W. 169; Mosser vs. Oriswell 160 Pa. 409.

ZAfldreds' Estate 229 Fe. 627.
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Acceptance of Bill of Exchange
The drawee of a bill by accepting it assumes a position analagous to that of the maker of a note. This
liability is primary. His acceptance may be, not for his
own benefit, not to discharge an existing obligation, but
to accommodate sone one; often the drawer,1' The
drawer may have drawn the bill also for the accommodation of the same person. Others, for the same object
may likewise have endorsed.
Capacity to Accommodate. Partnership
Individuals who are sui juris may give away their
money or other property, and they may give it away
by authorizing others to deliver their notes or indorsements, for the benefit of others. Ordinarily, a partner
-has no authority to make or endorse notes for accommodation," But his act will be valid, as respects the
partners, if they consent to it; if it subserves sonie business purpose of the partnership. Afirm's business inter
alia, is th esecuring loans on mortgage for its clients. It is
usual for it to make accommodation notes to assist its
clients, until the consummation of a loan on mortgage.
A note issued by the active member of the firm
to accommodate a client under those circumstances
will be binding on all the partners. So, will a note
issued for accommodation by one partner with the
knowledge and consent of the others, even though not
in the usual scope of the business, as will one issued
by that member of the firm to whom the others have
canxritted the entire management of the business.
"If it was the arrangenent between them (the partners,
AWhite vs. Hopkins 3 W. & S. 99; Lewis vs Hanchman 2
Pa. 416; Bank vs. Rogers 198 Pa. 62.7; Wilson vs. Savings Bank

45 Pa. 488; Gray vs. Bank 29 Pa. 365
"'arkevs. Smith 4 W. & S. 287
"Nat. Bank vs. Ott 235 Pa. 565
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says the trial court) that the father (who issued the note)
was the business end of the firm, and the younger man
(the firm was composed of father and son) assented to
whatever the father did, then Robert Ott (the son) is
liable upon the endorsement." With the consent of all
the members, one may endorse for accommdation; and,
after the dissolution of the firm, the iquidating acting partner may renew the endorsement, even if some
of the endorsers on the earlier notes have been omitted.
The endorsement will be available to a bank, which has
discounted the note if it had reason to believe that the
authority. The
endorsement was with the fir's
omission of one of the prior endorsers was not enough
t o excite suspicion. It was not the creation of a new
debt, but the renewal of a note which already bound
the firm. 1
Corporations
An agent of a corporation has no implied authority
to bind it by an accommodation endorsement. A coal
company is sued as the fourth endorser. Its name was
endorsed by the manager of the company, without auaffidaAn
accommodation.
for
and
thority,
judgprevent
will
vit of defense averring these facts
A executed a note
ment before trial.? Corporation
payable to corporation B, which B endorsed for the accommodation of A. A bank purchased the note before
maturity, paying full value for it, and without knowing
that the endorsement was for accommodation. The
charter of B gave it the power to make, buy, sell, negotiate and endorse commercial paper. Although this
power may not have embraced that of issuing accommoto
dation endorsements, yet, as there was a power
as
to
corporation,
the
bind
endorse, the endorsement will
D.Dundass vs. Gallagher 4 Pa. 205.
2Wat. Bank vs. Coal Co. 220 Pa. 89.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

one who, in ignorance that the endorsement was merely
for accommodation, paid value for the note."
Accommodation For Improper Purposes
If a note is made by directors of a bank, or other
persons with an understanding with the bank that it is
not to be enforced, but is to be used as an apparent
asset, for the satisfaction of the bank examiner, and
the bank becomes insolvent, and passes into the hands
of the receiver, who collects the assets for creditors, this
note will be, despite the intentions of its makers, enforceable against them. This is true if the bank is a
state bank or a national bank. "It will never do," says
a Federal judge quoted by Brown, J., "for the courts to
hold that officers of a bank, by the connivance of a
third party, can give to it the semblance of solidity
and security and when its insolvency is disclosed, that
the third party can escape the consequence of his fraudulent act." When the evidence was that the president
of a state bank, about to become a national bank, stated that they "needed paper," and asked for two
notes each for $5000.00, and the notes were made and
delivered to the bank, which subsequently passed into the
hands of thereceiver, who claimed payment of one of
these notes, the court refused to see that the intention of the maker of these notes w~s to aid the bank to
deceive the bank examiner. The bank, 'astutely says
Green J., =ay have desired to use the notes to borrow
money, to be used in the organization of the national
bamk".
'rst Nat. B=k vs. Darlington.Super. 802; 26 Super. 488.
'Peoples' Bank vs. Stroud 223 Pa. 33; Bank of Pittsburg vs.
KMrk 216 Pa. 452.
3ILyom vs. Benney 230 Pa. 117.
"230 Pa. 117.
"Tasker's Estate 182 Pa. 122.
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Prima Fade Evidence of Accommodation
The possession by the nmaker, of a note, which
bears the endorsement of the payee, is prima facie evidence that the endorsement is for his accommodation,
and that the note does not belong to the payee". But
when the maker is the cashier of a bank, which haa discounted the note the presumption from the maker's
possession of the note, which the bank must make, is
*notthat the note after endorsement was handed back to
him, in order that, as maker he might obtain the proreeds of its discount, but that it was put into his hands
as cashier of the bank in order that it might be discounted for the endorser. If the bank has given the
credit to the maker, and allowed him to withdraw the
proceeds of the discount, it cannot recover on the endorsemtent. A note payable to B and drawn by A had
on its face the words, "credit the drawer", but they were
unsigned. The bank discounted this note, putting the
proceeds to the credit of A. It was assuned that the
bank had a right to presume that the proceeds belonged
to A Until ih had notice that they did not. Proof was
excluded that the agreement between A and B was that
the proceeds should go to the credit of B, to keep alive
the insurance on his life, 'because not accompanied by
evidence that the bank was aware of the agreement!.
'TParke vs. Smith 4 S. & R. 287; Eckert vs. Cameron 43 Pa.
120; HeIzer vs. Helzer 193 Pa. 217; Mullison's Estate 68 Pa. 212;
One who takes such a note is presumed to know that it is an accommodation endorsement Cozens vs. Middleton 118 Pa. 622, Phillet vs. Patterson 168 Pa. 468.
'Nat. Bank vs. GerlA 232 Pa. 465
Wijthler vs. Reed 76 Pa."The possessioh by A of the -note,
outweighed apparently, the omission to sign the direction to
cre&t the drawer. The endorser ought to have endorsed speo"ally to "hiaown oraer or o thecredit of his own account
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Instrument Made in Part For The Benefit of X
A note may be made by several persons, payable to
X, with the intention that X should get it dscounted for
the benefit of all: of them, the makers and X. X endorses it to a bank as security for a previous debt of his
to it. The bank cannot compel payment by the makers,
as it might, were the note an accommodation note, because it is not a purchaser (as the law was for value
B has endbrsed a note for the acconmnodation of A.
At B's request, A in order "to show the transaction,"
makes a note payable to B. This note is not an accommodation note. It represents a contingent obligation of A
to B. If B has to pay the endorsed note, then A's note
becomes absolutely payable to B. Hence if B should
endorse this note to a creditor of his, as additional
security, i. e. to one not a purchaser for value, the creditor could not enforce payment of it'. If A and B exchange notes for equal sums, A's payable to B, B's payable to A, neither is an accommodation note. Each note is
the price of the other. Neither is gratutous. Neither maker
has any equity whatever. "Each received a consideration
for the notes he issued to the other, to wit, notes for a
similar amount."'".
Who Is Accommodated
Even when it is proved or conceded, that an endorsement or a making or acceptance is for acconmnodation, it is important to know for whose accommodation it was made. The accommodated party cannot
maintain an action against the accommodator. A's name,
as endorser, is on a note held by B, and B sues him as
endorser. A might have endorsed for the accommoda1

Royer vs. Nat. Bank 83 Pa. 248
VJarpenter vs.. Bank 106 Pa. 170.
'Smith's Appeal 125 Pa 404.

'Peale vs. Addicks 174 Pa. 543.
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tion of the maker or payee, or for the person to whom
the payee is about to endorse it. Sued by this person,
he may prove that he endorsed it to accomtnodate that
person and so to enable him to obtain the discounting
of it A's note has several endorsers. The holder sues
the second endorser, alleging that he endorsed for the
accommodation of the maker. The defendant alleges that
he endorsed in order to accommodate the holder at his request and to enable him to obtain a discounf. One joint
maker may make the note either for the accommiodation
of the other maker, or for that of the payee. The accommodated person may not be a party to the instrument. B
desiring a loan from X, A,to induce it, may make his
note, payable directly to X'. So, A being owner by endorsement of a note may endorse it and put it at the
disposal of X for his accommodation and X anay use it
without making himself a party to it by endorsement'.
Who is the accommodated party must be established by
testimony or documents. The fact that the payee
or holder has asked a party to endorse
or to
make is not decisive that the endorsement or making was
for his accommodation. Two makers of a note payable
to X. In X's suit aganst them, one of them, A, alleges
that he signed at the request of X, and that he received
no consideration. Says Henderson J., "In very many instances notes are signed at the request of the payee by
pLrsons who do not receive the money thereon but who
sign to give additional credit to the real principal," the
ciher maker'. A creditor asks the debtor who is making
a note for the debt, to procure the signature of X, who
'Ott vs. Seward 221 Pa. 630.
TAhmrbers vs. McLean 24 Super. 567; Tasker's Appeal 182
Pa. 122.
'Trust Co. vs. Haser 199 Pa. 17.
'Gunnis v. Weigley 114 Pa 191.
'Chambers vs. m{cLean 24 Super. 567.
1Mmas vs. JWoffett 1 W. N. 110
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is present, upon it. He also asks X to sign. This is not
irconsistent with the signing's being for the acconminodation of the debtor, and not of the creditor."
When a
note is not endorsed in the ordinary course of business,
nor for value, but at the request of the maker, and for
his benefit, the endorsement is an accommodation endorsement for the maker."
Time Within Which Note or Draft Must Be Used
The making of a note, or acceptance of a bill of exchange for the accomamdaton of X,
is virtually
construed to -mean that X is to use it by having it discounted, before the expiration of the day of payment. If
it is not used before but is used after that time, the
maker or acceptor may successfully defend against the
endorsee on the ground that he received no consideration." The same principal is applicable to accommodation endorsements, however short the interval between
their making and the expiration of the period over which
the instrument runs. A transferee of the note, by an
endorsement from the accommodated party ,after the
note's maturity, cannot enforce the accommodation endorsement." If a note with accommodation endorsers
is offered prior to its nmaturity to X, in payment of an
existing debt, but it is not accepted as payment until
after maturity, he cannot enforce the endorsements."
If the note or draft is negotiated before maturity to
one who can enforce the obligation of the maker, acceptor or endorser for accommodation, his transferee after maturity may enforce it". A note made for accom"Newbold vs. Boreaf 155 Pa. 227.
'Hoffman vs. Foster 43 Pa. 137; Bower vs. Hastings 36 Pa.
285; PlMler vs. Patterson 168 Pa. 468; Levicks vs. Lightner 11
Super, 499 Barnet vs. Offerman 7 W. 130.
IFeale vs. Addicks 174 Pa. 549
"Newbold vs. Boon 6 Super.. 511
"Wilson vs. Savings Bank 45 Pa. 488.
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modation is endorsed by X, before maturity, and becomes A's, who after maturity obtains payment from
the endorser. The endorser can compel payment by
the naker."
intervening Insolvency of Accommodated Party
The fact that a note made for the accommodation
of X, is still unused when he becomes insolvent, and
that he then promises to return it to the makers, is no
defence for the maker, when sued by one to whom, before its maturity but after this promise to return it,
it is transferred, even Mrerely as collateral security
for an antecedent debt to a creditor who has no knowlodge of the promise to return the note The right
of the maker to recall the note before its use is
apparently conceded by Williams J. but a mere unenforced request for its return is not equivalent to a recall".
Accommodation For Special Purpose
One to whom a note is offered bearing endorsenent may presume that the maker has from the endorser a right to use it as he chooses. A limitation
on this right, by the endorser, will be available only
against a holder who pays no consideration, or who,
having paid a consideration has knowledge of the limitation.
Various restrictions are presented by the
cases. The note is to be used by the maker for the
purpose of inducing a creditor to waive a mechanics
lien"! or for the paying of a particular debt." X is intrusted with the possession of a note, to which he is
not a party, for the purpose of getting it discounted
"Liebig Co. vs. Hill 9 Super. 469.

"'Hart vs. Trust Co., 118 Pa. 565.
1

"Conens vs 'Middleton 118 -Pa. 622. Then endorser sued either failed to prove knowledge of the restrkotion; or that the plaintiff had given a consideration
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for the benefit of the maker and payee (the endorser).
X fraudulently transfers it, as security for an existing
debt, to his creditor." B's draft on A is accepted by
A for accommodation, in order that the money obtained
on it may be used in a certain way. It is used in a
different way.' A makes a note payable to B with the
understanding that B is to use it in the settlement of a
judgment on which an attachment has been issued, and
B using it for a different
served on A as garnishee.
purpose, endorsed it to the plaintiff who took it in payment of a pre-existing debt.
Effect of Using For Different Purpose
The departure from the purpose will be a defence
for the accommodation maker, acceptor or endorser, unless the party suing has paid a consideration for the instrument, in ignorance of the purpose. If he has paid
a consideration, e. g. accepted the instrument in payment of a debt, and without knowledge of the purpose,
A ache can enforce the note, bill or endorsement.?
"Lenheiin vs. Wilmarding 55 Pa. 73.
'Royer vs.. Bank 83 Pa. 248. The maker may defend
aga'nst the creditor, who is not a purchaser for value.
'Bank vs. Rogers 198 Pa. 27. The acceptance cannot be
enforced, if the plaintiff knew of the misapplication. In Leatherman vs. Van Dusen, 9 Sadler 305, after a manifestly insufficient
affadavit of defense, another was offered viz. that the defendant made the note for the accommodation of the firm of B and
C, and that iB was using the note belonging to the firm to obta !n
The court refused
money which he app'opriated to himself.
to receive the supplemental affadavit. In Leatherman vs. Hecksher, 9 Sadler 398, a note was made for the accommodation of a
firm but it was payabl.e to B, one of the firm. That B got the
money and used it for himself is no defence to the maker.
"Bardsley vs. Delp 88 Pa. 420; Cf R.amback vs. Wolf 178
Pa. 356.
"Bardsley vs. Delp 88 Pa, 420; Cozens vs. Middleton 118 Pa.
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cepts B's draft, payable to A, for the purpose of paying
a debt of X. If the debt is otherwise paid, one who
becomes holder ot the draft, without value or with
knowledge of the purpose, cannot enforce payment."
Fraud
One can be induced by a fraud to become an acconimodation endorser.
E. g. he is induced by the
nker to endorse by the false statement that though
in fact insolvent he owned $100,000.00 worth of property and that he owned property worth $100,000.00 more
than all his debts. The note was endorsed before the
amount was inserted on the maker's assurance that
$600.00 would be inserted whereas it was filled up for
$1,437.00" A had executed a bond and mortgage to X
for the benefit of B. Subsequently B induced A to endorse a note, by saying that it was for the purpose of
taking up, pro tanto, the mortgage. The note was delivered, not to X, but to Y." A blank signed by X as
endorser, is left with A to be filled in with a note and
made payable to a certain person. A fills it -up in a
different way and makes it payable to a different person.' The court refused to find fraud, when A was
induced by the false statement of B, a member of a
firm, that the firm was solvent, to make a note for the
accommodation of the firm which note was being sued
on by an endorsee of the firm.' B gratuitously endorses
a note, to be used by the nmaker, in renewing an earlier
note for the same amiount by the same parties. It is
not used for that purpose for 22 months after the first
'Snyder vs. Wilt 15 Pa. 59

'Cummings vs. Boyd 83 Pa. 372;
Bank 9 Sadler 292.
'Smith vs. Building Ass. 93 Pa. 19

"Lenheim vs.. Wilmarding 55 Pa. 73.
"Bank vz. McCann 11 W. N. 480,

Cf. Beckhaus vs. Nail.
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note matured when the cashier of a bank procured it
from the maker, and had it discounted by the bank in
renewal of the first note. The bank could not recover from the endorser. The note was procured by
improper Tneans by its cashier, and contrary to the
original purpose of the endorser.*
Not Fraud
If A accepts a bill for the drawer's accommodation,
with the understanding that the proceeds are to be used
in taking up other bills on which A is liable, the fact
that the money obtained on the negotiation of the bill
is not so used, not only does not prevent the enforcement of the acceptance, but dQes not put on the person
suing, the purchaser of the bill, the burden of showing
that he is a bona fide holder for value.
"The fraud
consisted," says Woodward, J., "in misapplying the proceeds of the paper, but, that in the very nature of the
case imparted no taint to the paper itself." It occurred
after the plaintiff had discounted the paper."
Effect of Fraud on Holder
If a note or an enorsenent of it, is procured by
fraud (Sect. 94 Negot. Inst. Act) the holder has a defective title. If the holder negotiates it, the purchaser
of it will not, as he usually is, be deemed a holder in
due course, but the burden will be on him to prove that
he, or some one under whom he claims acquired the instrument as a holder in due course. (Sect. 98 Negot.
Inst. Act).! A made a note payable to B (who was
of the firm of B and C) and B endorsed it with his own
name and with that of the firnL B used the money
he obtained from X on the- note, for his own purpose.
"Bank vs. Irvie 3 P. & W. 250.
"Gray vs. Bank 29 Pa. 366
.Smith vs. Building Ass., 93 Pa. 19; Hoffmumm vs, Foster, 43
Pa, 137.
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No such fraud upon A was seen as put on X the burden in his suit against A, of showing that he X, was a
holder bona fide and for value.'
Hence, when the law regarded one who acquirea
a note simply as additional security for an already existing debt, as not a purchaser for value, such person
could not enforce the instrucent if tainted with fraud!
One who acquires the note, without knowledge of the
fraud, and who pays a consideration, may enforce it'.
Giving Time to Other Than Maker or Acceptor
One who becomes acceptor of a bill,* or a note,' for
the accornmodation of the payee, is not entitled to the
right of a surety. He has made himself the principal
debtor. Hence, the giving of time by the holder to
the payee, or later party, without the knowledge or
consent of the acceptor or -maker, does not discharge
him, even though the holder knew, when he gave the extension of credit, that the acceptance or making was
for accommodation. Nor does it entitle the acceptor or
maker, to the same extension.'
'Leatherman vs. Hecksher, 9 Sadler 398. Getz in X's action
ag*aint the f=-m of B and C he was required to prove that he Wa
a bona fide purchaser for value.
'Lenheim vs. WVlmarding, 55 Pa. 73; Cummings vs. Boyd 8
Pa. 372; Smith vs. Hine, 179 Pa. 260; Beckhaus vs. Nat. Bank,
9 Sadler 292; Boyer vs. Bank, 83 Pa. 248.
'Beckhaus vs. Nat. Bank, 9 Sadler 292; 0arpenter vs. Bank,
106 Pa. 170.
'White vs. Hopkins, 3 W. & S. 99.
'Love vs. Brown, 38 Pa. 3M7; Bank vs. WaIker, 9 S. & R.
229, Receiving interest from the payee from time to time, after
the note matures does not discharge the accommodation maker.
'W ite vs. Hopkins, 3 W. & S. 99; Trust Co. vs. Hazer, 199
Pa. 17; Bank vs. Wealker, 9 S & R. 229; 12 G. R. 382. Failure to
notify the maker of the nonpayment of the note, when it becomes due does not discharge him. Knowledge that the maker wag
an aceommodator has no effect, Stephens vs. Nat. Bank, 88 Pa.167;
Bank vs. Walker, 12 S. & R. 382.
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Releasing The Accommodated Party
If the holder of a draft or note, accepted or made
for the accommodation of a later party, releases the
later party with knowledge that the acceptance or
making was for accommodation, he does not ipso facto
discharge the acceptor or maker . Theirs is the position of a primary debtor.' The acceptance from the
acconmzxodated party, of a composition does not discharge the maker.'
Remedy of the Accommodating Party
The accomnodator, after paying the draft or note,
is entitled to reimbursement from the accommodated
party. If he is the acceptor of a bill, or the maker
of a note, as he is the party on it primarily liable, k a
does not sue on the note, but on the implied or express
contract to reimburse him. He uses the note as evidence of the amount paid.' If he assigns his claim,
the assignee can sue in his name, or even in his own,
if the person accommodated promises him to pay him'
Though the party accommodated is not on the bill or
note, he can be sued by the accomnodator..
If the
accommodator is an endorser, he may, if the accommodated party is a priot pa-ty to the note, sue him as
such.u A note is endorsed, severally, not jointly, by
B, then by C, then by D. On paying the holder, D
can sue any or all of the preceding endorsers though
they are endorsers for accomndation and he can reMime vs. Hopkins, 3 W. & S. 99.
L1ove vs. Brown, 38 P. SM.
AMoore vs. Phillips, 6 Super. 570; Barry vs. Withers, 44 Pa.
,56; Peale vs. Addicks, 174 Pa. 543; Meyran vs. Abel, 169 Pa.
215.
"44 Pa. S56.
4SlMler vs. Kreider, 78 Pa. 70. If he owes a debt to this
person, he can, when sued for the debt, set off his claim as
accommodator.
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cover all that he has paid", but if several persons jointly
beconming joint payees endorse for accommnodation, a
later endorser, also for accommodation may sue them
jointly and recover." It is needless to say that the
accommodated party cannot sue the accommodator as
such." After dissolution, one partner made a note for
the firmfs debt, and A for acconmodation endorsed it.
On paying the note A, can recover from the partners."
If the name of a corporation is put to a note as maker
by one having no authority to do so, the note being
payable to B, and endorsed by B, and, for the imaker's
accommodation, by C, C cannot on paying the note,
recover from the maker if he had knowledge of the
want of authority to make the note and of the fact
that the maker was receiving no consideration. Nor
is his position improved by the fact that the note had
been discounted by a bank, a bona fide holder for
value, and that C had paid the bank under compulsion.
The bona fide title of a holder (the bank) protects all
subsequent holders, as a -general rule, but this protection does not extend to a party to the original fraud."t
In an action by the accommodation endorser the defendant may show that he is not the owner of the note
and that the action is for another person and that the
defendant has a set-off against such person."
'Youngs vs. Ball, 9 W. 139; Russ vs. Sadler, 197 Pa. 51; Cf.
Mosser vs. Criswell, 150 Pa. 409.
"197 Pa. 51. The fact that all the endorsers were interested
in the corporation for whose benefit the note was made, has no
importance.
'Stephens vs. Bank, 88 Pa. 157.

"Meyran vs. Abel, 189 Pa. 215.
"Shoe Co. vs. Eichenlaub, 127 Pa. 164.
"Long vs. Long, 208 Pa. 368.

A and B make a note, B for

the accommodation of A. If B pays the note, he may be subTogated to the judgment against A, -to procure Teimbursement
Nat. Bank vs. Seibel, 255 Pa. 473.
"Brough's Estate, 76 Pa. 460.
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Right of Accommodation Endorser to Assigned Fumd
A owes $15,000.00 to X. He gives to X his note,
with B, C, and D, as accommodation endorsers for a
portion of his debt, which is received not as a payn~ent
but as additional security. A then makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors. X is entitled to a
dividend on the entire debt of $15,000.00 and the accornmodation endorsers of the note, which is paid since
the assignment are not entitled to any dividend, until all the debts existing when the assignment was
-made, have been fully paid. If their payment of the
collateral, since the assignment has reduced the amount
which X will be entitled to receive, the balance to which
he would otherwise have been entitled, will be distributed to B, C, and D, by subrogation of them to X."
Though not creditors of A at the time of the assignment, if they became such subsequently, by paying the
collateral and so reducing the dividend otherwise payable to X, they are entitled to receive the amount to
which X's dividend is reduced by reason of their payment.
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MOOT COURT
HANEY v. MOORE.
Express Warranty-Express words not necessary-Sales act-Set
off-Remedies of Buyer-Res inter alioa acta.
STATEMENT OF PACTS.
Haney sold 20 barrels of flour for $225 to Moore, the flour being
represented to be, and bought as being, of a certain quality. When
It was delivered, Moore found it to be inferior and notified Haney
who contested the representation.
Moore however, sold the uour
for $180.
Sued for $225, he claims a reduction.
Haney appeals.
Katz for Appellant
Mackie for Appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
McNICHOL, J.-The case at bar presents two questions, first
whether the plaintiff made an "express warranty," and second, did
the buyer pursue the correct remedy for the breach of that warranty?
The first question resolves itself into a determination whether the
flour "to be of a certain quality" -was an express warranty or not.
As urged by the counsel for the appellant, the Penna. Courts have
held that the seller does not make an express warranty unless he intends to, as said in McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 57.
The
recent uniform sales act of 1915, covers this case exactly
and the definition of an express warranty Is sufficient to
us to convince us that there has been an express warranty.
Sec. 14 of Uniform Sales Act, 191.
6 Purdon 7474
says: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating
to such goods is an express warranty, if the natural tendency of
such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the
goods relying thereon." "No affirmation of value of the goods nor
any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion
only shall be construed as a warranty."
The facts show here
there was an affirmation of fact which was more than the seller's
opinion. The seller deliberately represented the flour to be of a
certain quality.
And the buyer bought relying on his statements
and the goods proved to be otherwise. Here is a breach of that warranty. As the act does not require.intent to enter into an express
warranty, there is no doubt that there was an express warranty
as all the elements are present to constitute an express warranty
and the very fact that the flour wasn't as it was represented to be
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convinces us that there also was a breach of that '"Express Warranty."
Sec. 49, Act 1915, says: "In absence of any express or implied
agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer
shall not discharge the seller from liability in damage or other legal
remedy for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to
But if after acceptance of the goods the buyer fails
sell or sale.
to give notice to the seller of the breach of promise or warranty
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows or ouglit to know
It has
of such a breach the seller shall not be liable therefor."
been manifested beyond a reasonable doubt that the buyer gave the
seller notice, within a reasonable time, of the breach and he conThese facts surely It the meaning of the at which is
tested it.
clearly defined in distinct words and which cannot be construed any
differently.
We have now arrived at the second question which is; Did the
buyer pursue the correct remedy for the breach of an express warThe buyer surely has some remedy which is set forth in
ranty?
the Sec. 69., Sales Act 1915. The buyer may upon a delivery of the
goods and finding a breach of warranty on the part of the seller,
acquaint him of the fact and receiving no satisfaction he
may elect to accept and keep the goods and set up against the
seller the breach of warranty by way of recompense in deminution
of the price.
Williston on Sales, page 1018, says: The general measure of
damages for breach of warranty of quality is the difference between
value of the article actually furnished the buyer and the value,the
article would have had If it had had the qualities it was warranted
to have.
We an safely assume that the lower court awarded damages
through this channel of justice, as the counsel for the appellant
does not contend this point nor argue it, and we hereby affirm the
judgment of lower court.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The flour was represented to be, and was bought as being of
Herein then, we discover an express warranty.
a certain quality.
The vendee believed the representation and bought on the assumpThe word
tion, communicated to the vendor that it was true.
Armstrong v.
"warrant" is not necessary, to make a warranty.
Descalzi, 46 Super. 171.
The learned court below finds a warranty, in obedience to the
The vendor made
14th section of the Sales Act, 6 Purd. p. 7474.
an affirmation of a fact relating to the flour, the natural tendency
The fact afof which was to induce the buyer to purchase it.
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firmed, was not the value of the flour, nor an opinion of the vendor
merely,
The flour has been accepted by the vendee, and in turn sold by
him. This does not preclude a remedy on the warranty. The buyer
sued for the price may deduct from it, the difference between
what the flour was actually worth anct what it would have been
worth, If it had been as it was warranted to be; 48 Super. 171.
What is the actual worth of the flour?
The only evidence
on this question s the fact that Moore, the buyer, sold the flour for
$180.
This transaction is as respects Haney, res inter alias acta
Possibly Moore could have obtained more for the flour.
It was
to his interest to get the beat possible price, unless he dishonestly
intended to put too heavy a charge on his vendor, or to make him
suffer too heavy a defalcation from the price, $226. Possibly for
this reason no objection was made to the adoption of $180 as representing the actual value of the flour.
The price agreed to be paid by Moore to Haney is not "inter
alios acta," Both were parties to it.
It is an admission or declaration by them, that the flour was worth the price.
The difference between $225 and $180, then represents the
amount of credit on the contract price, to which Moore is entitled.
Affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH v. HESS.
Edidence--Expert testimony--comparispn of hand.writing--dogree
of certainty--threatening letters (Act May 19, 1913.)-"Morally
sure."
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Indictment for sending a threatening letter (Act May 19, 1913).
To connect Hess with the letter X, was called as an expert. He
compared the letter with two others admitted to have been written
by Hess, indicating the points of similarity and said he was morally
sure that Hess wrote the letter, but couldn't be absolutely certain.
There was always a possibility that the Inference from similarity
to identity of the writer was mistaken.
This was an important
part of the evidence connecting Hess with the letter,
The Court
allowed the jury to consider it.
Verdict guilty.
Motion for a
new triaL

OPINION OF THE COURT.
FLANNLIRY, F. J.-Counsel for the defendant asserts that the
testimony of the expert s inadmissible and cites several cases to
sustain his contention.
He does not question the competency of
X, the handwriting expert, but he insists that no expert is legally
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qualified to compare the disputed, signature with genuine signatures
and to state his opinion as to the result of such comparison. Three
of the four cited cases were decided before the passage of the Act
of May 15th, 1895, P. L. 69, and are therefore not in point. Those
three cases represent the common law view, which ha4 been vitally
changed by the above mentioned act. See Section 1 (b) and section 2.
Counsel cites one case decided since the passage of the
act of 1895, namely, Groff vs. Groff, 209 Pa. 612.
In that case the
competency of one alleged expert was successfully attacked.
The
one witness who quaified as an expert was allowed to testify, but
her testimony was excluded because she wrote the signature of
Groff on a blackboard and endeavored to compare it with other simulated signatures.
The statute requires that the disputed signature be compared with genuine signatures.
Her testimony was
excluded not because she was an expert, but because she did not
testify In the manner provided by the statute.
A careful reading
of this case does not warrant the conclusion reached by counsel for
the defendant.
If we confine our attention to the only point presented by counsel for the deefndant, namely the competency of a handwriting expert to testify, we need go no further.
The Act of 1895 permits a
handwriting expert to testify. He may compare the disputed signature with genuine signatures and state his opinion.
The Jury
decides whether or not the disputed signature is genuine.
There is another point in the case which we deem worthy of
consideration.
The expert said "he was morally sure that Hess
wrote the letter, but couldn't be absolutely certain."
The Act of
1895 permits an expert to give his opinion, and we may reasonably
consider that the above statement is the satisfactory expression of
an opinion.
We hold that it is. The law recognizes the fallibility
of human nature and accepts as thoroughly competent the testimony
of a witness who testifies that he is "morally sure."
We believe
that Commonwealth v. Swartz, 65 Pa. Superior Court 159, is directly
In point.
Extract from the charge of the lower Court to the jury
"Mr. Zeth testified he d-id not know of any expert who would be
willing to say positively, by comparison, that the writings were the
same, and that as far as he had ever gone, and as far as he knew of
any other expert having gone, was to testify they were morally sure
they were the same."
Extract from the decision of the Superior
Court. The fifth assignment is that the charge of the court was nnfair to the defendant.
We have carefully read the charge and
have come to the conclusion that there Is no merit in this contQntia.
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For the above reasons the motion for a new trial is denied.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The witness X "was called as an expert", and; was allowed to
testify as such.
It is not alleged that he was not shown to be
an expert. We assume that the trial court decided that he was,
on competent evidence.
This expert compared the threatening letter with two letters
which were admitted by Hess to have been written by him.
He
did this with a view to express an opinion of the Identity of the author of the three letters.
The making of such comparison is authorized by the act of May 11th, 1895 P. L. 69. The provisions of the
act apply in all courts of judicature, criminal and civil.
The opinion of the witness thus to be expressed may be that the
writing was, or that it was not, produced by the person who produced the test writings.
X said that he was "morally sure" that Hess wrote the letter.
He added that he could not be absolutely certain, there was always
a possibility that the inference from similarity of the writing to
i dentity of the writer was mistaken."
In so saying, he showed
candor and good sense.
For these qualities he is not to be impeached as a witness, nor the testimony to be disparaged because
If no
of them.
Sensible men know that what he said was true.
evidence was heard save opinions of witnesses which were entertained with absolute confidence, judicial investigation by means of
testimony would have to be yielded up, in favor of wager of battle,
or wager of law, or trial by ordeal.
See Wigmore, Evidence sec.
658,; In see. 698, that able writer observes "The witness' belief as to
the genuineness or non-genuineness of the disputed writing, need
not be a positive or unqualified one, it is enough if he 'believes' or
'thinks' it to be one or the other."
Cf. State v. Flanders; Wigmore's Case Book p. 177.
Further observation by us is unnecessary.
The opinion of the
learned court below adequately deals with the subject.

COMMONWEALTH v. HARPER
Malicious mischief--evidence-former conviction-admissibilitydestruction of gate across private way.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Prosecution for malicious mischief in cutting down a gate which
crossed a private way across A's land, at the point where it entered
a highway.
The court admitted evidence that, 20 years before
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the defendant had cut down another gate, at the same place, thO
Conviction.
Motion for a new trial.
land then belonging to X.
Brenneman for Plaintiff.
Cohen for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DOMBRO, J.-It appears that the court below admitted evidence, that twenty years before the occurrence of this offense, the
This
defendant had cut down another gate at the same place.
was objected to by the defense on the ground that the testimony
was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and therefore inadmissible as evidence of the cutting down of A's gate.
We agree to the general rule that former similar acts cannot
be shown in evidence with the object of proving the commission of
the one charged.
The question then presents itself to us, whether this evidence
of the former cutting, was introduced to prove the cutting down of
the gate of A, or Introduced to prove, or raise a presumption as to
some collateral requirement necessary to find Harper guilty of malicious mischief.
It is clear that the testimony was produced to show the necessary state of mind of the defendant to find him guilty.
In a prosecution for malicious mischief, it is Incumbent that the
Commonwealth show the reckless, destruction of the gate of A. The
mere act in itself may be due to negligence on the part of the defendant or ignorance of facts as to the ownership, etc., ad infinitum.
Proof that he did. cut down A's gate would not in Itself find him
The jury must be satisguilty of the crime of malicious mischief.
fled that the injury was done out of a spirit of revenge or of wanton destruction.
The act must be wilful, unlawful and malicious.
Malice is the very essence.
So if the Commonwealth introduced this former similar act and
it shows the present act to be reckless, malicious and wanton, that
evidence should be admitted.
The fact that the first cutting down of the gate occurred over
twenty years previous to the offense charged now, has no great
bearing on the admissibility of the evidence. It has so been held in
Pennsylvania.
The remoteness in point of time of the similar crime does not
Of course it would become weaker
exclude it as proof of motive.
as evidence as the length of time, since its occurrence Increases.
Yet one fact presents itself to us which prevents us from afAdmitting that the act
firming the decision of the lower court.
was done due to Harpers' jealousy or animosity to A, we cannot set
how the commission of the cutting down of X's gate has any bear-
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Ing. Because Harper had a malicious intention to break down the
gate of X, does that infer that he had a malicious intention to break
down the gate of A? We can not see that.
The mere fact of
the cutting down of A's gate In itself implies the motive.
The
jury must find the necessary motive from that alone in the absence
of other collateral admissible evidence.
We order a new trial.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Malice is an ingredient of the crime of malicious mischief. If A
believes he has a right to do what is alleged to be the mischief, it is
not malicious, Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 32 Super. 375.
That Harper cut down a gate at the same place 20 years before,
could not be proved, in order to convince the jury that he cut it
down, at the time alleged n the indictment.
But it is not enough
to prove that he cut the gate down. The act must have been done
with mialice.
He might possibly have thought that X had no right
to obstruct the way, and, if he did so, his cutting of the gate would
not be malicious.
But the evidence shows that the right was tested 20 years before, and conclusively negatived by the verdict of the jury and the
judgment of the court.
The former owner of the land over which
the lane was, procured Harper's conviction.
That was an adjudication.
Ile will not be heard to say, after that, that he believed
despite the conviction, that he had a right to cut down gates rossIng the way.
His cutting one down again shows a defiance of the
authority of the court to define his rights, and we think makes his
act malicious.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 Super. 113.
The Judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
Reversed.
HOSTETTER v. PLUME.
Damages--Violation of liquor law-Drunkennes--Remote or proyimate Cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Plume, a liquor seller, sold whiskey to Hostetter while he was
visibly very drunk.
He left the store at midnight very drunk on
horseback.
Ten miles away he got on a railroad track and he and
the horse were killed and mangled by a train.
His widow brings
this action.
Seitchick, for the plaintiff.
Sharfsin, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
VAUGHN, J--Act of May 8, 185b---"Any person furnishing intoxicating drinks to any other person in violation of any existing
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laws, or of the provisions of this act, shall be held civilly responsible for any injury to person or property in consequence of such
furnishing, and any one aggrieved may recover full damages against
such person so furnishing, by action on the case instituted in any
court, having jurisdiction of such form of action, in this commonwealth."
In explanation of this act we will state that it provides that any
person selling liquor in violation of an existing law shall be liable
in damages, at the suit of anyone aggrieved for injuries to person
or property suffered in consequence thereof. A person of known intemperate habits, or who was intoxicated when applying for liquor
may recover for injuries received while under the influence of liquor
furnished him by defendant and the widow and minor children (if
any) of such person, who has been killed while so intoxicated are, "parties aggrieved," within the meaning of the act, so as
to be entitled to recover actual damages.
This act is what the Plaintiff relies on and to support her contention cites several cases mostly bearing on what is proximate cause.
The court has made a thorough study of cases cited, both by Plaintiff and Defendant and what is or is not proximate cause depends
largely upon the circumstances in each inddvidual case.
What
may be considered as a proximate cause under one set of circumstances might not be under other and different circumstances, and the court feels that it must in this case use its own
judicial discretion and to do this we -must consider a long line of
decided cases and then compare them with the facts in this case.
In Litell vs. Young, 5 Superior Ct. 205, a saloon keeper sold
liquor to one B who on account of his intoxication fell upon the wayside on his way home from the saloon. As a result he was so frozen
that he lost a portion of each of his hands.
Action was brought
by B under the same act that the Plaintiff in the case at bar relies
on, and he was allowed to recover.
His injury by freezing was
held the proximate effect of his intoxication.
In Fink vs. Garman, 40 Pa- 95, A sold losuor to B who fell
from his horse and the wheels of his wagon running over him Injured him so badly that as a result of his wounds he died. Heldhis wife could recover even though he had procured drink from
other saloons than A's.
Same kind of case enly B
In Veon vs. Creaton, 138 Pa. 48.
If he h ad
was unmarried and over twenty-one years of age.
been married the court said his widow would have been entitled to
damages for his death. Taylor vs. Wright, 26 Pa. 617, is in point
with cases cited. Held widow could recover.
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In Elkin vs. Buschner 16 Atl. Reporter, 102. Liquor was sold
Buschner was a
to Buschner by Elkin a licensed saloon keeper.
man of known intemperate habits and while he was very intoxicated,
Widow was allowed
he fell from his wagon and broke his neck.
to recover.
Davies vs. McKnight, 146 Pa. 610, was an action against a saloon
keeper for furnishing liquor to an intemperate man, causing him
thereby to become intoxicated and fall into a gutter. The result of
such exposure caused pneumonia from which he died.
His widow
was allowed to recover.
This case Is cited by both Plaintiff and
Defendant.
The controversy being, was the death of Robert
Davies caused proximately by the use of liquor.
It is not necessary that the death be the Immediate result of drinking, as for instance the case of Fink vs. Garman previously stated. The giving
of the liquor may not be the direct cause, but it must be the proximate cause.
It -must be the cause from which we can trace the
Injury as a natural and not improbable consequence of the intoxication, otherwise there is no cause of action.
As we have said
what constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or damage Is
of course a question of fact to be determined in the light of the particular facts of the case in question.The intervening act of one, who in
defending himself against assault by an inebriate injures or kills
does not prevent the intoxication from being the proximate cause
of the injury, and the killing of a man or as in this case a -man and
a horse by a railroad train inferred from the fact that the body or
bodies were found on the tracks after he was last seen intoxicated
will be deemed to have been proximately due to his intoxication in
the absence of an appearance of negligance on the part of the railroad.
In the case at bar counsel for the Defendant ably argue that
the liquor could not have been the proximate cause as the man rode
ten miles on horseback before the accident occurred.
It s true
that he rode ten miles.
One man may take twenty drinks and
seemingly be sober while another man may take four or five drinks
and be dead drunk.
There are different degrees of intoxication
as was brought out in Elkin vs. Buschner previously discussed.
A
man is said to be dead drunk when he Is perfectly unconscious, powerless.
He is said to be stupidly drunk when a kind of stupor
comes over him.
He Is said to be staggering drunk when he
staggers in walking.
He is said to be foolishly drunk when he
acts the fool.
Many persons may say that a man was not intoxicated because he could walk straight or because he could get off
or on a horse.
What is -meant by the words In the statute which
makes it a penal offense and also the party liable In a civil action
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for damages, for giving liquor to a man who is drunk or intoxicated
(because both words are used in the statute) and also (selling to a
man of intemperate habits) is this, whenever a man is under the influence of liquor so as not to be entirely himself he is ntoxicated,
although he may walk straight, although he may attend to his
business, and may not give any outward or visible signs to the casual observer that he is drunk.
Yet if he is under the Influence
of liquor so as not to be as himself, so as to be excited from it and
not to possess that clearness of intellect and that control of himself
that he otherwise would have, he is intoxicated.
Hostetter did not
die of drunkenness, he did not die of the drink, but he did die from
getting on the railroad track.
Would he have come to this end if
he had not been under the influence of liquor, admitting that on
his ten mile ride he had sobered some? If he was so much under
the influence of liquor as not to have control of himself, and not to
have that intellectual perception that he would otherwise have had,
and in consequence of that was killed, then the drink or the intoxication would be the proximate cause of his death.
There is no
suestion that Plume willfully sold Hostetter liquor while Hostetter
was intoxicated thereby making him more so and that Hostetter
as a result of this 'intoxication was non comnpes mentls and
being so lost his life.
So in view of the many cases similar to this
case, we render judgment in favor of Mrs. Hostetter, wife of the deceased and Plaintiff in the case.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The 17th section of the act of May 13th, 1887, P. L. 108, makes
it unlawful for any person, with or without license to furnish any
spirituous, vinous, malted or brewed liquors to a person visibly affacted by intoxicating drinks.
Plume furnished such liquor to Hostettet who was "visibly very drunk."
In so doing he violated the
act of 1887.
The act of May 8th, 1854, P. L. 663, provides that any person
furnishing intoxicating drink to any person "in violation of any existing law shall be held civilly responsible for injury to person or
property in consequence of such furnishing.
Any person
aggrieved may recover full damages against him."
The widow brings the suit.
Has she suffered an "injury to
person or property?"
The death of her husband caused by negligence, is esteemed an injury to the widow, and she may recover
compensation for it.
So, his death caused by intoxicants furnished
him in violation of law, is treated as an actionable injury. Fink
v. Garman, 40 Pa. 95; Bower v. Fredericks, 46 Super. 540; Temnme
v, Schmidt, 210 Pa. 507,
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The death must be the result of the Imbibition of the liquor.
The liquor might act
It does not need to be the direct result.
physiologically on certain organs of the body, the brain, the heart,
and thus cause death.
The liquor may so affect the mind of the imbiber, as to superinduce acts which expose to danger and death; e. g. that of lying in
a gutter and with pneumonia as an effect; straying on a railroad
track with fatal collision with a locomotive as an effect. Bier v.
Myers, 61 Super. 158.
Whether the drunkenness was the cause of the death was for
the jury to decide.
The fact that the deceased traveled 10 miles
before he got on the railroad was to be considered by it in coming
to the decision that the intoxication Induced the act of entering the
track and continuing upon it.
The precedents negative the contention that the death was too
remote an effect.
Drunkenness lasts often a considerable time.
And causes a somewhat protracted series of foolish, hazardous,
reckless acts.
That the deceased could attempt to reach home,
that in doing so, he might meet with a variety of accidents was not
so improbable as to require us to characterize any one of the accidents as too remote.
Cf. Temme v. Schmidt, 210 Pa. 507, Davis
v. McKnight, 146 Pa. 610; Bier v. Myers, 61 Super. 158.
The opinion of the learned court below reviews a number of
important cases, and makes further discussion by us superfluous.
Affirmed.
Cress vs. Murdock.
Grould Rent-Presumption of Payment-Act Apr. 27, 1855-Interpretation of the Act by the Courts-Method of counting the
period of limitation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The facts of the case as presented for the consideration of the
court, are as follows: A conveyance of a lot in Philadelphia was
This rent
made in 1870, subject to a ground-rent of $200 yearly.
was never paid until 1910, nor demanded, nor recognized:.
In 1910
and the subsequent years, it was paid until 1917, when payment was
refused in virtue of the act of April 27, 1855, concerning presumption of extinction from non-payment for 21 years.
In 1912, the
then owner of the land charged with the rent conveyed to Murdock
expressly subject to the rent.
The land was sold as worth $5000,
of which ;4000 was deemed the capital of the rent, and $1000 was
paid in cash.
Kaw for Plaintiff.
Hendricks for Defendant
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
GROOME, J.-The case presented Is to be governed by the act
of 27 April, 1885, P. L. 369, and the Interpretation put upon the
The act provides: "In all
provisions of the act by our courts.
cases where no payment, claim or demand shall have been made
on account of, or for, any ground rent, annuity or other charge upon
real estate for twenty-one years, or no declaration or acknowledgment of the existence thereof shall have been made within that
period, by the owner of the premises, subject to such ground.rent
annuity or charge, a release or extinguishment thereof shall be presumer and such ground rent annuity or charge shall thereafter be
irrecoverable."
The question to be considered In this case Is whether the act
above quoted, has a retrospective as well as a prospective operation
with regard to ground-rents?
By the weight of authority, hereinafter quoted, we must conclude that the act is decidedly retrospective.
For example In the
case of Korn vs. Browne, 64 Penna. 55, the court ruled at follows:
"After a lapse of twenty years all evidence of debt excepted out of
The court will not encourage
the statute are presumed to be paid.
the laches and. indolence of parties, but will presume, after a great
length of time, some compensation or release to have been
made." "The lapse of twenty years, without demand of payment, is
evidence from which a jury may presume payment of the arrears
of ground-rent."
Here Justice Reed held that as the 7th sec. did
not go into effect for three years, and gavs. ample time to all owners of ground rents to make claims and demands for the same, so
as to prevent the bar of the statute, that this prospective commencement made the retrospective bar not only reasonable but constitutional.
This rule of interpretation has been followed in the following cases: Biddle vs. Hoover, 120 Penna. 221; Wingert's Appeal,
122 Pa. 486; Wallace vs. Presbyterian Church, 110 Pa. 164; Meek's
Estate, 3 Walker 126; Barber vs. Mullen, 176 Pa. 331; Heiss vs.
Bannister, 176 Pa. 337; Cray vs. McCreanor, 9 P& Sup. 438; Cadwalder vs. Springsteen, 36 Pa. Superior 134.
The case of Heister
vs. Shaeffer, 45 Penna. 537, treats the subject in this way: a claim
or demand had been made and judgment had been obtained
twenty-one years prior to the institution of that suit against the
Defendant upon the ground-rent. It was held that this took the ease
at bar out of the act of 1855; although that judgment was for
thirty-five years arrears of ground-rent and no other demand than
by the suit in which the judgment had been obtained ,had ever been.
made. Here we have even an acquiescence to the liability on the
part of the defendant, by reason of his having paid the ground-rent
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from the time he acquired the land until 1917.
In Fessenden's
Est., 170 Pa. 631, the court held, "Where land is devised subject to
a charge created upon it by will, and the devisee subsequently sellU
the land, but continues to pay the charge In exoneration of his vendee, the limitation under the act, providing that annuities and
charges shall be extinguished If no demand is made within twentyone years, will begin to run only from the time the devisee ceases
to pay; and in such case the charge upon the land will not be extinguished under this act, although no demand shall have been
made upon the grantee of the land within twenty-one years. Cadwalder vs. Springsteen, 36 Super. 134, holds that the mere entry of
the landlord upon the unoccupied land for the purpose of making
a demand within twenty-one years, prior to the suit, where there
was a record owner of the land, and no attempts to find or serve him
was shown, plus a judgment upon the ground-rent obtained more
than twenty-one years before the suit was brought, was not sufficient to toll the statute of 1855.
The demand or payment must
be made within twentyone years of the commencement of the action.
We must count back from the date when the suit Is brought,
and if within twenty-one years from that date a lawful payment or
demand for such ground-rent has been made, then the act Is not a
bar to the plaintiffff's claim.
A case directly in point Is that of Murphy vs. Green, 48 Super.
1, in which Judge Morrison ruled as follows: (1) Where no payments were made of a ground-rent from the time of Its creation In
1849, until 1900, and then the owners of the ground paid the rent
from 1900 to 1906, and the ground landlord received the balance,
and the owner represented that the ground-rent was valid and subsisting and that they would thereafter pay the same, and it was purchased by the plaintiff as such, the fact that no payment was made
from 1849 to 1900 does not extinguish the original ground-rent, and
the ground owners who agreed to pay and did pay the rent from
1900 to 1906, and their successors In title cannot enforce a claim
to redeem the rent as a redeemable ground-rent under the act of
June 24, 1885.
Nor can they be heard to say that the ground-rent
has become extinguished and irrecoverable.
(2) In such a case
even if the irredeemable ground-rent had been extinguished by the
non-payment of it for fifty years, still the ground owners who made
the promises to pay and made the payments and their successors
in title are estopped from denying that the groundLrent which had
been purchased on the strength of the recorded deed creating ltand
the promises to pay and the payments from 1900 to 1906, was a valid
and subsisting Irredeemable ground-rent.
(3) Where suit Is
brought in such a case to enforce the payment of ground-rent acer-
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Ing after such payments made the twenty-one years referred to in
the act of Apr. 27, 1855, P. L. 368, are the twenty-one years next
preceding the bringing of the suit. The case at bar clearly is governed by the rulings as laid down in the above cited case, so we are
ot the opinion that judgment must be rendered, for the Plaintiff.
Judgment for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The learned court below has properly accepted the authority
of Murphy vs. Green, 48 Super. 1, and held that despite the act of
27th April 1855, an installment of a ground-rent of which previous
installments have not been paid for 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000 years, is
nevertheless recoverable if 21 years of non-payment and non-recognition have not preceded the suit for the insfallment.
The rent
was never paid for 40 years.
It was then paid for 7 years i. e. until 1917.
In 1912 the land was conveyed to the defendant, and the
capital represented by the rent, was subtracted from the agreed
value and retained by him.
In a suit brought for installments fallIng due after 1917, a recovery was allowed because 21 years of nonpayment had not immediately preceded the bringing of the action.
Murphy vs. Green is a clear authority for the decision. We do not
deem the cases cited therein as so clear.
It would strike the profession as a novelty to hold; that if A had
allowed B to have adverse possession of his land for 21 or more
years, with the consequence that the title had passed from A to
B, then title could pass back to A, if by any means, he then recovered the possession and so compelled B to bring an action against
him.
On the contrary, it has bees held that B could recover on account of his earlier adverse possession for 21 years, despite the fact
that counting back from the action, he could not show such possession for 21 years.
The analogy between the adverse possession
of land, and the refusal to pay ground-rent is obvious.
We must
nevertheless yield to the law as it has been developed by those who
have the authority to make it.
Affirmed.

